

## **Migrant day labourers in South Africa: worker centres and the regulation of informality**

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### **Abstract**

South Africa's small but growing informal sector has become an increasingly important source of employment for migrants to the country's urban centres. Informal hiring sites have become a common feature of the post-apartheid city, yet the hardships associated with precarious work have received little sustained policy or programmatic intervention. This paper presents the results of three surveys that document conditions faced by native- and foreign-born day labourers in Tshwane (formerly known as Pretoria) and recommends the creation of worker centres to improve the livelihood opportunities and wellbeing of migrant workers in the informal economy.

The growth of informal employment in South Africa is a symptom of an economy that has been unable to generate sufficient employment opportunities, particularly for less-skilled workers. With an official expanded unemployment rate of more than 34 per cent, many jobseekers, both immigrants and the native-born, have turned to day labour as a means of subsistence. Unfortunately, however, as currently constituted, day labour markets are incapable of providing adequate employment, either in terms of wage rates or work hours. Day labourers work "off the books" for employers engaged in the mainstream economy. They typically are paid in cash, endure systemic instability in their employment arrangements, and have little or no access to government employment security programmes. This paper documents the labour market outcomes associated with this instability, including daily unemployment rates approaching 80 per cent, daily earnings for those who manage to secure work of between ZAR 120 and ZAR 150 (or approximately USD \$9.00). In addition, the limited reach of social assistance programmes in South Africa, whose eligibility is based on citizenship status, is unable to substantially benefit members of the foreign-born workforce or their dependents. As a result of these factors, day labourers' earnings fall well below the poverty threshold.

In response to the conditions present in this labour market niche we propose the creation of worker centres—labour market intermediaries that hold the promise of regulating informal hiring "from within" the job market. Evidence from the United States suggests worker centres can be an effective means through which to organise workers and set labour standards, while also aiding immigrants in managing the multiple hardships associated with precarious work.

### **Introduction**

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa's small but growing informal sector has become an increasingly important source of employment for immigrants who are relocating to the country's urban centres. Informal hiring sites, where men and women congregate to wait for employers to hire them as construction labourers, gardeners and domestic workers, have become a common feature of the post-apartheid city, yet the hardships associated with precarious work have not been the subject of sustained policy or programmatic interventions. For unauthorized immigrants in particular, day labour has become an entry point into the economy. Unauthorized immigrants are often drawn into informal employment because the barriers to entry are low, in part because government enforcement of labour standards does not meaningfully extend into these employment arrangements. When enforcement efforts target sites of informal economic activity they typically do so through policing measures aimed at curtailing these activities. For example, government authorities may periodically conduct sweeps of areas where

street trading occurs or they may arrest day labourers who stand in public spaces. However, these enforcement actions tend to be episodic and counterproductive. Rather than eliminating informality—and with it some of the few sources of income generation for persistently underemployed workers—such initiatives merely heighten the economic insecurity of the informally employed while also criminalizing their activities and leaving the root causes of the spread of these income-generation strategies unchanged.

This paper presents the results of three surveys that document the conditions faced by native- and foreign-born day labourers in Tshwane (formerly known as Pretoria) and offers recommendations for interventions to improve the livelihood opportunities and wellbeing of immigrant workers. The next section provides details regarding the methodology used to survey day labourers. This is followed by two sections that summarize the results of the surveys. The first examines the wages and earnings of immigrant day labourers and the second examines poverty rates among this workforce. The final section considers the impact of regulatory deficits in the informal economy and proposes US-styled worker centres as a civil-society response to the challenges facing day labourers.

## **Data and methods**

The analysis presented here of the labour market outcomes of immigrants day labours in South Africa is drawn from three primary sources: (1) a pilot survey of day labourers in Tshwane in 2004 that was used to inform the design of a national survey, (2) the first-ever national survey of day labourers in South Africa that was completed in 2007-08, and (3) a follow-up survey in Tshwane that was completed in 2015. The national survey was administered across several phases, culminating in the first and only systematic, sampled survey of day labourers across South Africa. The 2015 Tshwane sample is part of a second round of surveying to examine changes in the dynamics of the day labour economy.

A pilot survey administered in Tshwane in 2004 represented an initial attempt to systematically collect data on the demographic and labour market characteristics of day labourers in South Africa. In addition to collecting data from the local labour market, this pilot tested a survey methodology and questionnaire. This set the stage for the countrywide survey project.

The national survey began with a scoping phase, and the information gathered during this phase was used to develop a procedure for estimating the number of day labourers in South Africa. Over the course of 2005 and 2006, members of the research team travelled across the country to perform in-person counts of day labourers at informal hiring sites. It was estimated that there are 1,000 informal hiring sites across South Africa where at least 45,000 jobseekers stand along the roadside and at busy intersections looking for work as day labourers.

The next phase focused on the sampling procedures and the design of the survey instrument. The capitals of all provinces and the key population hubs of rural areas were sampled proportionally based on the number of day labourers present. Cluster sampling was used to ensure that the workforces in rural/urban areas and at small/large hiring sites were not over- or under-represented. A sample of between 5 and 10 per cent was targeted for the project.

The third phase involved training the fieldworkers and conducting the interviews. The fieldwork began in February 2007 and was completed in early 2008. The sample was then evaluated to ensure that the target regional proportions were achieved. In total, 3,830 questionnaires were analysed, representing approximately 9 per cent of the target population.

The follow-up survey in Tshwane followed similar procedures. The survey instrument was amended to include additional questions regarding labour market outcomes. In total, 242 day labourers in Tshwane were interviewed as part of the 2004 survey, 335 day labourers were interviewed in 2007, and 290 were interviewed in the 2015. These counts represent approximately 10 per cent of the workforce.

For the 2007 survey, data on place of birth was collected for 335 day labourers, 129 (39%) of whom were born in South Africa and 206 (61%) of whom were born in another country. Of the foreign-born day labourers, 112 (54%) emigrated from Zimbabwe, 72 (35%) from Mozambique, 18 (9%) from Lesotho, and three from Namibia, and one from Swaziland. For the 2015 survey, data on place of birth was collected for 287 day labourers, 127 (44%) of whom were born in South Africa and 160 (56%) of whom were born in another country. Of the foreign born, the vast majority were from Zimbabwe (142 or 89%), 10 (6%) were born in Lesotho, six were born in Malawi, and just two were born in Mozambique.

The Zimbabwean day labourer workforce is mainly comprised of men (88%) who undertake a range of manual-labour jobs related to construction, gardening and material moving. Seventeen Zimbabwean women were included in the Tshwane sample. They most often were employed as domestic workers, though several reported doing tiling and plastering work.

### **Day Labour and Migration in Tshwane**

The City of Tshwane is South Africa's fifth largest metropolitan municipality. Since 1996 its population has risen by 65 per cent and currently stands at more than 2.92 million (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2014). The local economy has been expanding as well; by 2011 the municipality's growth rate was nearly 70 per cent higher than the national average (City of Tshwane, 2013), and with its large government, finance, education, and automotive sectors, Tshwane is the second largest contributor to national gross domestic product (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2014). Growing tourism, construction and services sectors also contribute to the municipality's economic output. These latter sectors are among the key employers of lower skilled workers, including many recent immigrants.

Tshwane has an official unemployment rate in 2011 of 24.2 per cent and an official poverty rate of 27.9 per cent (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2014). Much of the poverty population is concentrated in economically disadvantaged areas, including the numerous informal settlements in the region. Although the informal economy in South Africa is small relative to that of many other African countries, it has been growing (ILO, 2013), including its day labour market (Theodore et al., 2015).

Over the period 2004, 2007 and 2015, the composition of day labour markets experienced significant demographic shifts as immigrants came to comprise a majority of the workforce. In 2004, just 12 per cent of day labourers in Tshwane were immigrants, with Zimbabweans accounting for 7 per cent of the workforce (Blaauw et al., 2006). By 2007, however, the majority of day labourers were immigrants. In 2007, fully 63 per cent of day labourers were foreign born while in 2015 this figure was 56 per cent. In both periods, Zimbabwe continued to supply the largest number of foreign nationals to Tshwane's day labour markets, with Zimbabweans representing 33 per cent of all jobseekers in 2007 and 50 per cent in 2015.

Foreign-born day labourers in South Africa most often are working without authorization (Blaauw et al., 2012). In the 2007 survey, in order to ascertain the immigration status of foreign-born day labourers, interviewers asked workers to show them whatever documentation they had that could be used to determine their status in South Africa. Seventy-two per cent of foreign-born day labourers acknowledged that they were in the country without immigration authorization, though just 11 per cent could produce a visitor's passport or visa.

Day labourers are hired to perform manual-labour tasks related to construction and gardening. In Tshwane, immigrants are most often employed as assistants to bricklayers, painters, plumbers, and roofers, as well as to perform work as gardeners, movers, plasterers, and painters. Approximately 60 per cent indicated that they had never held a full-time job. Of those who had been employed in a full-time position, previous employment in construction, service jobs such as security, and domestic work was common and these jobs mainly were of short duration. The most common reasons that workers left their full-time jobs were related to a business closure or expired contract (57%) followed by low pay (21%). With few if any alternative employment options available, immigrant jobseekers turned to jobs in Tshwane's informal economy.

## **Wages and Earnings of Zimbabwean Day Labourers**

Wages across Tshwane's day labour market are low and insecure. Using the 2015 survey, we examine income levels from day labour, as well as the key determinants of workers' earnings, for Zimbabweans, the primary immigrant group within the Tshwane day labour workforce. Zimbabwean day labourers report that they work, on average, just 1.2 days each week, despite searching for work at informal hiring sites an average of 5.4 days per week (nearly half of these jobseekers search for work seven days a week). When they are able to secure employment, Zimbabwean day labourers' average wages were ZAR 27.81 (USD 1.97) per hour.<sup>i</sup> The wage structure in day labour markets is highly compressed, ranging from ZAR 14.21 (USD 1.01) for site clean up to ZAR 22.65 (USD 1.60) for gardening to 26.10 (USD 1.85) for painting. The outlier within the wage distribution is tiling jobs, which pay ZAR 60.71 (USD 4.29) per hour, though survey respondents reported a low number of hours worked in this occupation. Because of the low wage rates and instability of employment, workers' average weekly earnings from day labour are just ZAR 198.31 (USD 13.77).

Cross-sectional regression analyses were conducted to explore the determinants of weekly earnings (Theodore et al., 2017a). The results shed light on the factors that influence income levels in the day labour market and the very limited role that human-capital attributes play in determining worker pay. We do not find a statistically significant relationship between weekly earnings and levels of formal schooling for primary school completed, some secondary school completed, secondary school completed (matriculation), post-secondary school qualification, or vocational training completed. The sign of the coefficient for previous employment in a high-skilled, formal-sector job was positive but the variable itself was not statistically significant. In addition, the number of different day labour jobs performed in the last month did not exhibit a statistically significant impact on earnings.

In short, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between typical human-capital measures of educational attainment, vocational training qualifications, or previous employment experience in a high-skill formal-sector job. These results are at odds with human-capital theory that postulates that income levels will rise with the level of education and training. There are several explanations for these findings. First, it is difficult for workers at informal hiring sites to make their skill sets legible to prospective employers. Because employers have limited means through which to assess worker skills, highly skilled day labourers are rarely able to distinguish themselves from less-skilled workers. When the use of skills differentiation as a means of securing higher wages and improved employment opportunities is impeded, wages scales become compressed (Theodore et al., 2015). The resulting downward wage pressures affect all day labourers regardless of their human-capital attributes because all workers at informal hiring sites must compete for the same limited number of jobs that are on offer each day.

Second, and relatedly, because informal labour markets are not regulated by strong institutional mechanisms or social norms that increase pay levels, wage rates are established by direct, face-to-face competition between workers. Because day labour markets are characterized by extraordinarily low employment rates—just 20.5 per cent of all day labourers secured a job each day in the week prior to the survey—competition for employment is intense, which serves to maintain constant downward pressure on wages. Furthermore, individual workers have little recourse in terms of bargaining for higher wages. They of course may decline a job offer because the pay is too low. But with an oversupply of jobseekers, it is likely that employers will have a more-than-ample number of workers from which to select a temporary employee. With jobseekers treated as if they are a substitutable labour supply, wage structures flatten, in large part regardless of worker skills.

## **Poverty among Immigrant Day Labourers**

With low employment rates and daily earnings, it is little surprise that the typical monthly incomes of day labourers are low. Using weekly earnings and employment probabilities, we estimate the average monthly earnings of immigrant day labourers in Tshwane to be 785.76 (USD 55.60), slightly below that of South Africa-born day labourers (Theodore et al., 2017b). South Africa does not have an official

poverty line, so the adequacy of day labourer earnings is assessed using Statistics South Africa's (StatsSA, 2015a) lower- and upper-bound poverty lines. To calculate the poverty rate among the day labour workforce, we used survey responses to the question, "excluding yourself, how many dependents do you support with your income from day labour?" along with our estimate of workers' monthly income from day labour based on reported weekly earnings.

Between 91 and 95 per cent of day labourers in Tshwane earn below the StatsSA poverty threshold, with a slightly higher proportion of foreign-born day labourers earning below-poverty wages (between 93% and 97% of the workforce). We then estimate the monthly shortfall for every day labourer given the wages earned and the number of dependents that must be supported. Given these parameters, we estimate that day labourers on average would need to earn an additional ZAR 2,192 (USD 155.02) to ZAR 3,844 (USD 271.85) per month to raise them and their dependents above the poverty line. Immigrant day labourers face the greatest average shortfall, with earnings needing to increase by between ZAR 2,387 (USD 168.81) and ZAR 4,146 (USD 293.21) per month. However, rather than these differences, the story here is the low earnings levels across the day labour market, regardless of nationality.

It appears that the prevalence of poverty-level earnings is on the rise in the Tshwane day labour market. A similar analysis was conducted using the 2004 survey. At that time, between 79 and 91 per cent of day labourers in Tshwane earned incomes that placed them and their dependents below the poverty line. The inflation-adjusted monthly shortfall for day labourers at that time was between ZAR 1,450 (USD 102.55) and ZAR 2,929 (USD 207.14). Using a small subsample of 23 foreign-born day labourers in the 2004 survey, it appears that migrants fared considerably better than South Africa-born day labourers, with between 52 and 74 per cent of workers earning incomes that placed them and their dependents below the poverty line (these latter results should be viewed with caution given the small number of foreign-born workers in the 2004 sample). This does suggest, however, that whatever advantages immigrant day labourers may have enjoyed in the earlier period have been erased and nearly all day labourers and their dependents now must subsist on incomes that are below the poverty level.

### **Moving beyond Regulatory Deficits in the Informal Economy**

Economic informality is typically understood as arising from an absence of state action in the economy owing to various regulatory deficits, principally those related to the state's capacities to govern economic activities occurring within its territory. Consensus has formed around the idea that adequate explanations of the scope, nature, and evolution of the informal economy must have as a central component an understanding of the state's role in shaping the dynamics of urban informality. Centeno and Portes (2006) have expressed the prevailing view through three propositions. First, "An informal economy will develop *when and where it can*" though "the 'degrees of freedom' for this development to take place is affected both by the regulatory capacity of state agents and the scope of regulation they are expected to enforce." In other words, in the absence of adequate labour demand, informal economic activities will form at the interstices of the state's regulatory apparatus as the underemployed devise ways of generating income. Second, "*the relationship between the informal economy and the state is, by definition, one of inevitable conflict.*" Because informal economic activities are a direct or indirect challenge to the state's regulatory authority, conflicts within the realm of economic governance inevitably arise. And third, the "relationship between state strength and informality" is impacted by "(a) the regulatory intent of the state, and (b) the social structure and culture of the population subject to it" (Centeno and Portes, 2006: 27-28, italics in original). Regulatory intent—the objectives of government enforcement of labour standards, including those that are clearly articulated through legislation and those that exist within the silences that occur when state agents use their discretion and do not fully enforce policy mandates—provides clear signals about a state's de facto enforcement priorities. Strong and well-resourced states may tolerate the spread of informality and substandard employment if reining in degraded work runs counter to other, more privileged policy objectives and if the populations that would benefit from the state's greater regulatory reach into zones of informality are not favoured (Fernández-Kelly and Garcia, 1989; Roy, 2005).

The consequences of regulatory deficits within the informal economy include the erosion of wage scales; inequitable distribution of labour market risks and rewards; perversion of wage setting resulting in pay levels are determined more by worker vulnerabilities than by skills, productivity or market rates; and unfair competition between firms as enterprises that exploit worker vulnerabilities become standard setters in an industry. Because informal economies are inadequately and often improperly regulated by the state, and because the resultant regulatory deficits produce deleterious effects on market processes, pro-worker civil society actors are frequently drawn into ensuing state-economy conflicts.

Furthermore, when immigrants are heavily involved in informal economic activities, state enforcement of immigration laws and its regulation of economic activities can have negative consequences on the rights of immigrant workers. This, in turn, exposes a contradiction in the prevailing immigrant/human rights paradigm. As Piyasiri Wickramasekara (2008: 1249) has noted:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the right of every person to leave any country, including his/her own, and the right of every person to return to the home country. But there is no corresponding right to enter or stay or work in a third country, since no state has surrendered that right under any international treaty. This makes the mobility of persons from one state to another quite restricted, and vastly reduces the scope of the above human rights.

This restriction on mobility typically takes the form of criminalising unauthorized immigrants, which has the unintended consequence of heightening their labour market vulnerabilities. In many low-wage, high-turnover industries, unauthorized immigrants have become the workers of choice, and employers benefit from the below-market wages and employment instability that characterise these sectors. This is the case in many parts of the world in industries such as construction, landscaping and domestic work where immigrant workers comprise the core workforce in unskilled and semi-skilled positions.

### **Worker Centres: Regulating Labour Markets “from within”**

Intensely competitive conditions in day-labour markets militate against individualized attempts to raise wages and improve working conditions. If a given worker refuses to accept a job assignment because the pay is too low or the hazards are too great, employers have enormous latitude for finding substitute workers since the employment agreement is nonbinding and the supply of jobseekers is large. Therefore, in a labour market characterized by vast supply-demand imbalances, combined with an absence of effective state enforcement of labour standards, collective action is required in order to raise the floor on wages and working conditions. Collective action, in turn, requires organizing, bolstered by a resolve among the members of the workforce to attempt to regulate the labour market from within. In the United States, immigrant day labourers have been able to do this by developing an internal decision-making structure at informal hiring sites that allows them to set and maintain minimum-wage rates, shun abusive employers, and defend hiring sites in the face of efforts by municipal governments and law-enforcement authorities to ban the activity. In their more developed and institutionalized form, these strategies have led to the creation of worker centres, labour-market intermediaries situated within the informal economy.

An increasing number of worker centres and other non-profit organizations in the US seek to set standards in the informal economy, while also aiding workers in managing the hardships associated with working in the informal economy (see Fine, 2006; Gleeson, 2012; Martin, 2010). Day labour worker centres typically establish hiring halls from which day-labour markets can be more effectively regulated. As a direct intervention in informal labour markets, these intermediaries set wage rates, develop job-allocation systems, and assist day labourers in redressing wage theft (Theodore *et al.*, 2009; Theodore, 2015). In addition, some are actively engaged in providing workplace safety training. Evaluation research has found that these interventions are effective in raising wages, improving health and safety on the job, and providing a needed regulatory intervention in casualised labour markets (Meléndez *et al.*, 2014, 2016; Theodore, 2016; Visser, 2016).

The core activity of day labour worker centres is to establish an adequately functioning labour market where workers and employers can negotiate employment arrangements. This typically is achieved through the creation of a hiring hall and bolstered through three primary activities:

1. *Wage setting.* Setting minimum wages is accomplished either through strictly enforced wage floors or through guidelines that workers and employers are expected to follow. This reflects the understanding that without regulatory intervention in the hiring process, many day labourers will be offered wages that are well below market norms. Minimum wages perform other functions as well. Worker centre wage rates take wages out of competition, meaning that negotiations between workers and employers do not revolve around the desperation of workers for a daily income, but instead around the requirements of the job and the qualifications of the worker. In most cases, centre-established minimum wages explicitly prevent the lowest bidder from winning the assignment – unless, of course, the minimum threshold has been met. The rationale for this is that many day labourers are marginalized workers who might be induced or coerced into accepting unduly low wages.
2. *Job allocation.* Replacing the struggle for jobs at informal hiring sites with mechanisms for the equitable distribution of employment. Day labour worker centres implement distribution systems that allocate jobs randomly, but also contain provisions that respect employer preferences and account for the types of skills needed to complete an assignment. Job-allocation systems are important, since typically there is a supply-demand imbalance in the labour market. The day labour employment relationship is characterized by highly variable employer demand; employment fluctuates from week to week and month to month, so workers rarely are able to enjoy employment stability. To cope with the task of distributing employment opportunities in an equitable manner, most centres have developed variations on two types of job-allocation systems: lotteries and lists. With a lottery, workers are selected randomly from a drawing of available jobseekers. When a list is used, workers are selected in the order in which their names appear on a registry. At most centres, and regardless of the system used, provisions are in place to allow employers to request the services of workers with whom they have a previous employment relationship.
3. *Wage claims, grievance resolution, and worker education.* Day labourers commonly endure violations of basic labour standards, particularly the underpayment and non-payment of wages. Most worker centres address the problem of wage non-payment through worker education programs, in part as a way to gather needed information in case the issue needs to be directed to enforcement authorities, and in part so that day labourers themselves can more effectively deter employers who might resort to this practice. The resolution of wage claims is pursued through collective action of day labourers in conjunction with centre staff. This type of approach usually involves a combination of direct action, negotiation, and legal remedies. Wage claims are often resolved through a negotiation process with the employer that begins with notifying them that wage payments are due. However, when this is not effective or if the employer contests the claim, the issue is directed to wage enforcement authorities or the courts. Efforts to reclaim unpaid wages and resolve grievances between workers and employers are tied to a broader mission of worker education. Several worker centres emerged out of local struggles to defend the labour rights of low-wage workers employed in both the formal and informal economy. Active participation in the filing of wage claims is seen as a necessary extension of these activities.

As explained above, competitive pressures in day labour markets hinder the ability of individual workers to redress violations of labour standards. The process of individualised enforcement of standards is depicted in Figure 1. When workers are hired by employers that fail to comply with labour standards, these firms can become standard setters in an industry either because (a) workers move on to other employers in the hope of improving pay and conditions, thereby increasing employee turnover rates but


otherwise leaving conditions unaltered or (b) employers maintain substandard conditions because they are able to access the oversupply of workers who, because of their vulnerabilities, are compelled to accept the jobs on offer. Over time, firms that “play by the rules” and are not engaged in worker exploitation face increased competition from high-violation firms, leading to a spread of substandard practises across industry segments as previously compliant firms struggle to retain market share.

Worker centres operate from an alternative theory of change (Figure 2). When workers are hired by firms that unintentionally are out of compliance with labour standards, worker centres are able to educate employers and help set higher standards. When workers are hired by firms that intentionally violate labour standards, worker centres can try to restrict the supply of workers to these firms, take actions to recover unpaid wages, pursue legal remedies, and otherwise seek to maintain standards by sanctioning unscrupulous employers. Firms that are already compliant with labour standards have these practises indirectly reinforced by worker centres and standards are maintained across the industry. This strategy is sometimes described as “closing off the low road” because it contests business models that are based on labour exploitation through supply-side interventions, in particular establishing and monitoring wage rates, restricting the supply of labour to exploitative firms, and redressing the non-payment of wages.

In the US, immigrant day labourer organizing has occurred primarily under the auspices of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), and its 39 member organizations. Founded in 2000, NDLON is an alliance of independent worker centres that operate worker-led organizations designed to promote collective action among day labourers. NDLON-affiliated worker centres do more than establish and monitor rules in day-labour markets. They represent an exercise in direct democracy in a sector of the economy that lacks transparency and which confers its benefits selectively and inequitably. By developing workforce strategies to intervene in these markets, day labour worker centres reinforce the notion that, through collective action, workers can be a regulatory force in the informal economy. Initiatives of this nature hold the potential of enabling day labourers to mitigate the risks they face in the informal economy and, if successful, establish more sustainable employment standards in the day-labour market.


The suggestion here is not that worker centres, or other locally scaled interventions for that matter, can provide long-term solutions to the multiple regulatory deficits that beset informal economies. High unemployment rates, entrenched poverty, and labour market exclusions based on race, gender, and citizenship will require concerted state action to improve the number, quality and distribution of jobs in the economy. Nonetheless, worker centres are a promising approach for immediately addressing some of the perverse consequences that result from regulatory deficits in the labour market, such as below-poverty wages, undue exposure to health and safety hazards, and the exploitation of casualised labour. Furthermore, because day labour worker centres do not exclude workers based on citizenship, nationality, or other markers of difference, they are able to bridge divides that exist among informal-economy workers, and through collective standard setting and worker organizing they are able to raise the floor on wages and working conditions.

Figure 1: Logic model connecting individualised enforcement activities with labour-standards compliance



Note: adapted from Shrank, 2014.

Figure 2: Logic model connecting worker centre enforcement activities with labour-standards compliance



Note: adapted from Shrank, 2014.

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<sup>i</sup> The ZAR/USD rate used was the average for the November 2015, obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (2016) *Selected Historical Rates* accessed at: <https://www.resbank.co.za/Research/Rates/Pages/SelectedHistoricalExchangeAndInterestRate.aspx>.